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THE SPECTRE OF POPULISM
“a spectre is haunting europe — the spectre of communism. all the powers of old 
europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Tsar, 
metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies” wrote Karl marx 
in 1848. Today, it would seem that there is another very different spectre haunting 
europe. it is not communism – that has been consigned to that proverbial dustbin of 
history - but another dangerous ‘ism’, populism.
of course there have been varieties of populism in the past. Russia had its own 
species during the 1870s and 1880s, a similar though politically less radical version 
of populism grew up in the United States during the 1890s and reappeared in different 
iterations several times thereafter (mccarthyism was in its own way a populist revolt 
against liberalism), and then there were the many varieties of populism which i was 
told as a student were the main problem in latin america during the post-war years. 
So in some regards the study of what is known as populism is not new. indeed, i can 
well recall reading my first book on the subject in 1969 when I was studying politics, 
and that was a rather fine LSE study edited by the very great duo of Ernest Gellner and 
Ghita ionescu entitled Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics.
So we might say there is nothing new here. But that would be wrong – for clearly 
there is something rather significant new happening today. For one thing the populist 
problem (if that’s what it is) appears to have migrated towards europe where it did not 
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have much of a hold before; and for another it has assumed a much more widespread 
form. Whereas previous populisms were specifically national in character, this new 
populism has assumed a more international form.
indeed, if we listen to most european leaders today it would appear to have become 
the political challenge of our age. Former German Finance minister Wolfgang Schauble, 
not a man to mince his words, has talked of a rising tide of “demagogic populism” 
which if not dealt with frontally and decisively could easily threaten the whole european 
edifice. A Chatham House report came to much the same conclusion in 2011. “The 
trend of rising support for populist extremist parties”, its author wrote, “has been one 
of the most striking developments in modern european politics”1 – one which not only 
poses a challenge to europe alone but to democracy itself.  
WHO IS A POPULIST?
But is this just a european phenomenon? clearly not. across the atlantic in the USa, 
a similar if not exactly identical dragon emitting all sorts of unpleasant and noxious 
sounds has arisen in the shape of Donald Trump, one of the very few billionaires in 
modern history who also lays claim to being a “man of the people”. But billionaire 
or not this quite extraordinary political phenomenon, a combination of Gatsby and 
howard hughes with a dash of Randolph hearst thrown in for good measure, has 
delivered “shock and awe” in equal amounts. indeed, by tapping into popular discontent 
in what Gavin essler termed twenty years ago the “United States of anger”2, he has 
shaken the US establishment (not to mention their european partners) to their very 
core by saying things one is not supposed to say in polite company.
moreover, it was not just Trump, you will recall, who railed against the elites and the 
powerful during the 2016 US presidential campaign. Bernie Sanders may term himself 
a socialist. and he could never have said many of the appalling things which Trump 
said. But some of his targets – most obviously the corporations whom he claimed 
had sold the American worker short and the Wall Street financiers – were not such 
dissimilar enemies to those identified by Trump. Hillary may have won the Democratic 
nomination in the end. But Sanders inspired his supporters in ways she never did.
But if Sanders and Trump together can be classified as a populists then who, one 
wonders, is not now a populist? and where do the ideological fault lines lie? Should 
Jeremy Corbyn not also be defined as a populist? After all, he claims to speak on 
behalf of the ‘many’ rather than the ‘few’. But then so too does mrs may who in her rush 
to win over white working class voters has talked quite volubly of governing in favour 
of the ‘left-behinds’ and the ‘just about managing’ in order to make Britain a country 
that works for everyone and not just the rich and powerful. 
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Yet this has also been the dominant narrative of such political parties as Syriza in 
Greece, The Five Star movement in italy, and Podemos in Spain - and all three of 
those are on the left. This cannot be said of the National Front in France of course, 
but there is no more rampant populist in europe today than marine le Pen, who has 
campaigned  against the european Union and its twin, “rampant globalisation”, both 
of which have in her words been “endangering” French “civilisation.” indeed, while 
the successful former banker macron made his appeal to the better educated in 
prosperous cities like lyon and Toulouse, le Pen spent most of her time campaigning 
in the run-down towns of the north east, speaking to workers whose parents (if not 
they themselves) had once voted communist. 
UNDERSTANDING POPULISTS
Populism would thus seem to defy easy political pigeon-holing. But on one thing 
most writers on the subject seem to be united. They don’t much like it and have 
tended to approach the subject with a mixture of enormous surprise – who 
amongst them predicted Brexit and Trump in 2016? – mixed in with a strong dash of 
ideological distaste. 
This bias has not gone unnoticed of course. indeed, in a piece in moneyWeek 
authored by John Stepek, he made the entirely fair point that as far as he could make 
out “the bulk of opinion columns” dealing with populism tended to fall into two main 
categories: “sneering or patronising”.3 The controversial sociologist Frank Furedi 
was more scathing still. Populism, he argued, had virtually become a term of abuse 
directed against anybody critical of the status quo. Worse, it implied that the revolt 
facing the West today was not a legitimate response to deep seated problems but 
was rather the problem itself.4 
This was clearly the conclusion arrived at in one influential book on the subject. 
Populists may claim to talk in the name of the people, argued Jan-Werner muller in 
his well-reviewed study What is Populism5? But one should not be deceived. When 
populists actually assume power, he warned, they will create an authoritarian state 
that excludes all those not considered part of the proper “people”. Beware the 
populists therefore. They may talk the democratic talk. But hidden behind all that 
rhetoric is a dangerously anti-democratic impulse.
This antagonism to populism may be understandable given that so much of what 
some populists say is deeply concerning from a liberal perspective. moreover, as 
their critics have legitimately pointed out, their policies can be - and have proven to 
be - deeply disturbing. Still we face a quandary. on the one side there are the analysts 
of populism who tend in the main to look at the phenomenon all the time holding 
their noses as if there were a bad smell in the room. on the other, there are millions 
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of very ‘ordinary people’ out there who actually vote for such movements. if nothing 
else, it says something about the state of the West when you have the overwhelming 
bulk of public intellectuals lining up one side to critique populism, some more fairly 
than others to be sure, and millions of their fellow citizens voting in their droves for 
parties and individuals of which most experts and academics appear to disapprove. 
Trump may not be my cup of tea (or yours) but he did after all win the US presidential 
election. Yet ‘we’ seem to despise him and those who voted for him. Brexit was not my 
preferred option, but it gathered more votes than Remain and did so because it tapped 
into something important. 
my point here is a simple but an important one. We do not have to like or agree with 
populists. and we should not forget our role as critic. But we should at least try and 
distance ourselves from our own political or ideological preferences, and try and 
move beyond moral outrage at something so many of us might not like and instead 
seek to understand what is happening here. Because something clearly is. and what 
is that something? We should not exaggerate. Nor should we conclude that the world 
we have known is about to collapse. it is not. But the tectonic plates are shifting. The 
mood across the West is turning sour. many millions of people are obviously very 
unhappy with the old order and have expressed their alienation by voting against the 
establishment in very large numbers. 
WHAT IS POPULISM?
But what then is populism? The answer to this simple question is by no means 
clear. Populism reflects a deep suspicion of the prevailing establishment; that this 
establishment in the view of most populists does not just rule in the common good 
but conspires against the people; and that the people, however defined, are the true 
repositories of the soul of the nation. 
Populists also tend in the main to be nativist and suspicious of foreigners (though 
this is more likely to be found on the right than the left). more often than not they 
are sceptical of the facts as provided to them by the establishment press, and in 
most cases (and again this is truer of the right than the left) they don’t much like 
intellectuals. Nor in general do they like big cities and the metropolitan types who 
happen to live in them. 
They are (to use a term made popular by David Goodhart) the ‘somewheres’ – that is 
to say people who want to be part of somewhere as opposed to those who are the 
‘anywheres’.6 indeed, the fault line in Britain today he argues (and the same might be 
true in many other Western countries) is between those who come from Somewhere: 
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people rooted in a specific place or community, usually a small town or in the 
countryside, socially conservative, often less educated, and those who come from 
anywhere: footloose, often urban, socially liberal, university educated and who tend to 
feel at home nearly everywhere. But it is the somewheres we have to understand, for it 
is they after all who constitute the real basis of what he sees as the populist revolt.
 
WHAT HAS CAUSED THE RISE IN POPULISM?
What has caused this surge of support for populism? There are at least three 
competing narratives.
1. one was not so long ago provided by moises Naim, editor of the magazine 
Foreign Policy. Populism has to be taken seriously he agrees. But it has no 
intellectual coherence. it is merely a rhetorical ‘tactic’ that demagogues around 
the world have always used, and will continue to use, to gain power and then hold 
on to it. as Naim puts it:  
 
“The fact is that populism is not an ideology. instead, it’s a strategy to obtain and 
retain power. it has been around for centuries, recently appearing to resurface 
in full force, propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the 
threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.”7 
 
This however does not make populism any the less dangerous. indeed, populism 
is invariably divisive, thrives on conspiracy, finds enemies even where they do 
not exist, criminalises all opposition to them, plays up external threats, and 
more of than not insists that its critics at home are merely working for foreign 
governments. Yet one would be wasting one’s time – he implies - seeking some 
deeper cause for this particular phenomenon.
2. a second – more influential - view is that populism in its modern iteration is a 
search for meaning in what Tony Giddens earlier termed a ‘runaway world’ of 
globalisation – a world which according to Giddens at least is “shaking up our 
existing ways of life, no matter where we happen to be” moreover, this world, says 
Giddens, is emerging in “an anarchic, haphazard, fashion….fraught with anxieties, 
as well as scarred by deep divisions and a feeling that we are all “in the grip of 
forces over which we have no control”.8 indeed, not only do we have no control. 
Because of the speed and depth of the changes across traditional frontiers, 
many citizens feel as if the world is not just passing them by but undermining 
their settled notion of identity born in more stable , more settled times. This 
loss has been felt by everybody. But it has been experienced most by an older 
cohort of white people who simply want to turn the clock back to a time when the 
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people in their towns looked like them, sounded like them and even had the same 
traditional loyalties as most of them: an age in other words when there were fewer 
immigrants and even fewer muslims living amongst them.  
 
Globalisation and socio-economic factors in this account obviously play a role, as 
Giddens makes clear. But according to this narrative at the heart of the modern 
populist problem is not so much economics as identity and meaning driven by a 
set of inchoate, but nonetheless key questions about who i am, what i am, and do 
i still live in my own country surrounded by people who share the same values and 
allegiances?
3. There is however a third way of understanding populism. and this argues that 
modern populism is less the result of an identity crisis as such and much more 
the result of what the indian economist (now adviser to indian Prime minister 
modi) arvind Subramanian has termed “hyperglobalisation”.9 This latest form of 
globalisation he notes began slowly in the 1970s, accelerated rapidly in the 1980s, 
took off in earnest in the 1990s, and continued to accelerate thereafter – until, 
that is, the crash of 2008. For years the results of this thirty year headlong drive 
towards the future only seemed to be positive and beneficial. Indeed, according 
to the many defenders of globalisation, the new economic order generated 
enormous wealth, drew in once previously closed economies, drove up the world’s 
GDP, encouraged real development in countries that had for years been poor, and 
most important of all in terms of human welfare, helped reduce poverty too. Not 
surprisingly india, china and the developing countries loved this new world order. 
They were its beneficiaries.  
 
But for the West more generally it has through time created all sorts of downside 
problems. Wealth became ever more concentrated in the hands of the few, as 
shown by Thomas Piketty10. middle class incomes stagnated. meanwhile, many 
of the working class in western countries found itself being driven out of work 
either by jobs going elsewhere or by a rush of cheap imported goods largely 
coming from china. and to add to their economic woes immigration undercut 
the price of their labour. Thus what may have been great for the corporations 
and the consumer – not to mention the chinese - turned into an economic 
tsunami for the traditional bastions of labour. 
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WIDER CAUSES OF POPULISM
The impact of neoliberalism?
a crucial component part of this ‘materialist’ interpretation of populism has more 
recently been provided by James montier and Philip Pilkington. They do not deny the 
fact that globalisation has important downsides. on the contrary globalisation is very 
much part of the reason for populism. But they develop the argument even further 
by insisting that what has led to the very real crisis the West is not just globalisation 
in the abstract but what they more precisely term ‘a broken system of economic 
governance’. 
This system which they define as “neoliberalism” arose in the 1970s and has been 
characterised since by four ‘significant economic policies’ only one of which they 
identify as globalisation, the other three are:
“the abandonment of full employment as a desirable policy goal and 
its replacement with inflation targeting…; a focus at the firm level on 
shareholder value maximization rather than reinvestment and growth…; 
and the pursuit of flexible labour markets and the disruption of trade 
unions and workers’ organisations.”11 
Taken together this new neoliberal order, they believe, has not only skewed the 
balance towards capital and away from labour. The regime it has created has also 
given rise to lower inflation, lower growth rates, lower investment rates, lower 
productivity growth, increasing wealth and income inequality, diminished job 
insecurity, and a seriously deflationary bias in the world economy. moreover, instead 
of the 2008 crisis undermining this order, it has only made things much, much, 
worse. and given all this, we should not be so surprised that there has been  
a backlash in the form of populism. The only surprise perhaps is that it did not  
happen earlier. 
The End of Communism
of course one does not have to pick and choose between these various narratives. 
all contain some element of truth. Yet in my view they also leave some important 
parts of the story out.
one thing they leave out - or perhaps do not stress enough - is the enormous impact 
long term which the failure of communism and the collapse of the USSR has had, 
and still has, on the world we live in. Before 1989 and 1991 there seemed to be some 
kind of balance in the world: some built-in limit to the operation of the free market. 
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however, by the 1990s, all this had been swept aside. 1989-1991 also led in my view to 
a high degree of hubris and over confidence in the West. Anything was now possible; 
and even if it caused pain to some, this was a price worth paying for the general good; 
and anyway there was now no serious opposition. or any alternative. So one could 
press on regardless.
Nor did we quite figure out what it might mean for the West of massive low wage 
economies like china joining the world market club. many economists will no doubt 
tell you, and do, that free trade is always a good in the long term. Ricardo said so, 
adam Smith said so, Keynes said so, even milton Friedman said so. So it must be for 
the best. moreover, if jobs have been lost in the eU and the USa this, we are told, has 
little to do with free trade and more with new labour saving technologies. in fact, all 
those manufacturing jobs in europe and the US would have had to go anyway because 
of technology and automation. But there is ample evidence to suggest a rather 
different story: that in fact millions of jobs have been lost in the West because of new 
emerging economies joining in the game. it is not merely a nationalist myth. either 
way, one should not have been surprised when politicians like Trump and his populist 
equivalents in europe launched their tirades against globalisation and gathered in  
the votes. 
Powerlessness
But it is more than just about economics. i would argue that populism is very much 
an expression in the West of a sense of powerlessness: the powerlessness of 
ordinary citizens when faced with massive changes going on all around them; but the 
powerlessness too of western leaders and politicians who really do not seem to have 
an answer to the many challenges facing the West right now. many ordinary people 
might feel they have no control and express this by supporting populist movements 
and parties who promise to restore control to them. But in reality it is the established 
political parties, the established politicians and the established structures of power 
as well which are equally powerless. Powerless to stop the flow of migrants from the 
middle east and africa. Powerless to control the borders of their own nation states. 
Powerless when faced with a terrorist threat. Powerless to prevent off-shoring and tax 
avoidance. And powerless to reduce unemployment to any significant degree across 
most of the eurozone.
Now this might have been finessed but for two other factors: one, quite clearly was 
the 2008 financial crisis. As suggested above, this not only delivered a major blow to 
western economies, the eU in particular; it also undermined faith in the competence 
of the establishment from the bankers to the economists at the LSE. Who after 2008 
would ever believe the experts again? or think they might be on your side. The other 
factor here was a series of major setbacks in the field of foreign policy ranging from 
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iraq to libya. These not only did enormous damage to the middle east but exposed 
the West and western leaders to the charge of being incompetent and lacking in 
strategic nous. it was no coincidence of course that one of the themes Trump 
returned to time and again was the iraq war – a clear demonstration in his view that 
the ‘establishment’ simply could not be trusted with america’s security. 
Global Power Shifts
Finally, i wonder too how much the widespread notion that there is a great power 
shift now taking place in the international order has not also contributed to the rise of 
populism in the West? after all, for the last few years we have heard the same mantra 
being uttered by the bulk of our so-called public intellectuals: namely, that the ‘rest’ 
viewed here as either asia, china or that interesting combination known as the BRics 
will sometime soon be running the world. 
as i have argued elsewhere, this view of an enormous power shift leading to either 
a post-american, post western or even a post- liberal world order has been much 
exaggerated. Nevertheless, it has become for many the new truth of our age; 
almost the common sense of our times. and it has had consequences, intended or 
otherwise, and one of these has been to make many people living in the West feel 
deeply uncertain about their future. This in turn has made many of them look to 
those politicians and movements who say they will stand up for the West; or, in the 
american context, make america great again. moreover, the view that a power shift 
was or is underway has also helped those in the UK make the case for Brexit. indeed, 
in the UK the argument that the eU in particular was in terminal decline, and that one 
had to look to other parts of the world economy – china and india most obviously – 
clearly played an important role in mobilizing the case for Brexit.
 
DOES POPULISM POSE A THREAT TO GLOBALISATION? 
To what degree however does populism pose a serious threat to globalisation? The 
simplest answer to this is not as much some alarmists would lead you to believe – at 
least that is what the ‘facts’ tell you if you measure globalisation by such indicators 
as cross-border financial flows, international tourism, and foreign direct investment. 
By any measure, the world is not de-globalising. Nor is it likely to do so as long as its 
five biggest economic actors (the European Union, the United States, China, India, 
and Japan) continue to support policies which favour more integration not less, 
more extensive supply chains not fewer, and see continued advantage economically 
by being part of a world market. To this degree the forces in favour of globalisation 
would still appear to be far stronger than those pitted against it. 
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Globalisation may still be secure. however, the case for it is no longer being made 
with anything like the same confidence we found ten or fifteen years ago. And if the 
unpicking of what Simon Fraser has termed “the pro-globalisation orthodoxy of the 
post-cold war period”12 continues, then we could very well find ourselves facing even 
more challenges to the liberal economic order. The populist backlash, one suspects, 
still has a long way to run.
________________________
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